

## *Discussion of a Special Issue of The American Statistician*

# Technical overview of some of the alternative procedures

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AMERICAN STATISTICAL  
ASSOCIATION  
*Promoting the Practice and Profession of Statistics*

## Wendy's television commercial (1984)



**Where's the Beef?**

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**Where's the Beef?**

**In the TAS Special Issue!**

## Setting the Scene

- **43 papers** in the special issue can be grouped into 5 categories:
  1. Getting to post  $p < 0.05$  era
  2. Interpreting and using  $p$
  3. **Supplementing** or replacing  $p$
  4. Adopting more **holistic** approaches
  5. Reforming institutions: changing publication policies and statistical education
- I will **discuss 7 papers** in the special issue that I found interesting.
- **Not all of the ideas in the papers are new.** Some of the papers highlight and/or add emphasis to previous work published elsewhere
- My specific aims are:
  1. Share some of the **techniques you might use.**
  2. Provide you with the **main ideas** and a **glimpse of some technical ideas.**
  3. Tweak your curiosity enough that you **look further at the special issue.**
- The P-value topic brings both **Bayesian and Frequentist** thinking into the conversation.

## One Last Thing Before We Really Start

A nice paper in the special issue that reviews the *long history* of p-values, including their origins, the controversies, and many of the principal characters involved in these facets:

**“Before  $p < 0.05$  to Beyond  $p < 0.05$ : Using History to Contextualize  $p$ -Values and Significance Testing,”**

by Lee Kennedy-Shaffer



# Abandon Statistical Significance

*McShane, Gal, Gelman, Robert and Tackett*

- No bright line threshold for reporting p-value results. Report **continuous p-values** (i.e., not  $p < .05$  or  $p < .01$ ). It does **NOT** mean we no longer should use p-values.
- **Avoid using the term “statistically significant”** to avoid confusion with scientifically important.
- It should be recognized that a small p-value is a poor measure of evidence against a null because it **only signals that there is a problem with at least one assumption** behind it, without saying which one.
- **Sharp null hypotheses are poorly suited** for statistical inference.
- Authors (and editors) should place **more emphasis on what motivates the research** questions by discussing ‘currently subordinate factors,’ such as prior evidence and possible mechanisms for real effects.

# TAS Topic-Contributed Session at JSM 2019

## Monday, July 29<sup>th</sup>, CC-110

### Editor's Choice: Papers Published in The American Statistician During 2018

- 10:35 AM Abandon Statistical Significance  
Blakeley McShane,; Andrew Gelman, Christian Robert, David Gal, Jennifer Tackett
- 10:55 AM On Mixture Alternatives and Wilcoxon's Signed-Rank Test  
Jonathan Rosenblatt, Yoav Benjamini
- 11:15 AM A Bayesian Survival Analysis of a Historical Dataset: How Long Do Popes Live?  
Luciana Dalla Valle, Julian Stander, Mario Cortina-Borja
- 11:35 AM Guns and Suicides  
Danilo Santa Cruz Coelho, Daniel Cerqueira, Marcelo Fernandes, Jony Pinto Junior
- 11:55 AM Forecasting at Scale  
Sean Taylor
- 12:15 PM Floor Discussion

**Many thanks to *Biometrics Section, Section on Bayesian Statistical Science, and Section on Statistical Learning and Data Science***



# Valid p-values behave exactly as they should: some misleading criticisms of p-values and their resolution with s-values

*Sander Greenland*

## s - values

Let  $p$  denote the probability of an event  $E$ . Suppose we find  $s$  such that  $p = \left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^s$ .

This expresses  $p$  as the probability of getting  $s$  consecutive heads in tosses of a fair coin.

The  $s$ -value, defined as  $s = -\log_2(p)$ , is a translation of how likely or unlikely  $E$  was.



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The  $s$ -value *contextualizes the p-value* by representing the evidence it conveys against the null as the same evidence that seeing all heads in  $s$  tosses of a coin would convey against a hypothesis that the coin is fair.

# Valid p-values behave exactly as they should: some misleading criticisms of p-values and their resolution with s-values

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For example,  $s = -\log_2(.05) = 4.3$ . Considering the .05 threshold as evidence against a null is **no different than doubting a coin is fair because 4 tosses in a row came up heads**. Is that really strong evidence?

On the other hand,  $s = -\log_2(.005) = 7.6$ .

# Improving the Use of P-Values

*Daniel Benjamin and James O. Berger*

- If using the current language of ‘statistical significance’ for a novel discovery, **replace the .05 threshold with .005**. Refer to discoveries with a p-value between .005 and .05 as ‘suggestive,’ rather than ‘significant.’

# Improving the Use of P-Values

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- If using the current language of ‘statistical significance’ for a novel discovery, **replace the .05 threshold with .005**. Refer to discoveries with a p-value between .005 and .05 as ‘suggestive,’ rather than ‘significant.’
- When reporting a p-value in a test of a hypothesis  $H_0 : \theta = \theta_0$  vs.  $H_1 : \theta \neq \theta_0$  **also report**

$$P(H_0 | X = x) = \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - \pi_0}{\pi_0} \times \frac{1}{\text{BF}_{0:1}} \right]^{-1} \geq \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - \pi_0}{\pi_0} \times \frac{1}{-e \text{plog}(p)} \right]^{-1}$$

$\pi_0 = .5$

$p$	.10	.05	.01	.005	.001
$P(H_0   X = x)$	.385	.289	.111	.067	.018

## Improving the Use of P-Values

*Daniel Benjamin and James O. Berger*

$$H_0 : \theta = \theta_0$$

$$H_1 : \theta \neq \theta_0$$

Marginal density of  $X$  :  $m(x) = \pi_0 f(x | \theta_0) + (1 - \pi_0) \int f(x | \theta) g(\theta) d\theta$

$$P(H_0 | X = x) = \frac{f(x | \theta_0) \pi_0}{m(x)}$$
$$= \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - \pi_0}{\pi_0} \times \frac{1}{\text{BF}_{0.1}} \right]^{-1},$$

where  $\text{BF}_{0.1} = \frac{f(x | \theta_0)}{\int f(x | \theta) g(\theta) d\theta}$ .

## Improving the Use of P-Values

Daniel Benjamin and James O. Berger

From here there are a variety of ways to establish bounds for  $BF_{0:1}$  with one such way derived in Berger and Selke (JASA, 1987) and the later Selke (*The American Statistician*, 2001):

$p$  is the observed data and  $p$ , given  $a$ , is distributed as  $\text{beta}(a, 1)$

$$H_0 : a = 1$$

$$H_1 : a \neq 1$$

$$BF_{0:1} = \frac{1}{\int_0^1 ap^{a-1}g(a)da} \geq \frac{1}{\max_a(ap^{a-1})} = -e p \log(p), \text{ and so}$$

$$P(H_0 | X = x) = \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - \pi_0}{\pi_0} \times \frac{1}{BF_{0:1}} \right]^{-1} \geq \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - \pi_0}{\pi_0} \times \frac{1}{-e p \log(p)} \right]^{-1}$$

# Aligning P-values and Bayes Factors

*Jonathan Rougier*

$X_1, \dots, X_n$  iid  $N(\theta, \sigma^2)$  ,  $\Theta = \{\theta : \theta \geq 0\}$  ,  $\sigma^2$  known

$H_0 : \theta = 0$  vs.  $H_1 : \theta > 0$  ,  $p = 1 - \Phi(\sqrt{n} \bar{x} / \sigma)$

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
$$\begin{aligned} \text{BF}_{0:1} &= \frac{f(x | \theta = 0)}{\int_0^\infty f(x | \theta) g(\theta) d\theta} \geq \frac{f(x | \theta = 0)}{f(x | \theta = \hat{\theta})}, \quad \hat{\theta} = \max(0, \bar{x}) \\ &= \begin{cases} \exp(-n\bar{x}^2 / \sigma^2) & , \text{ if } \bar{x} \geq 0 \\ 1 & , \text{ if } \bar{x} < 0 \end{cases} \\ &= \begin{cases} \exp\left\{-(1/2)[\Phi^{-1}(1-p)]^2\right\} & , \text{ if } \bar{x} \geq 0 \\ 1 & , \text{ if } \bar{x} < 0 \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

(see also, Edwards, *Psychological Review*, 1963)



# Aligning P-values and Bayes Factors

Jonathan Rougier



$p$	Lower Bound on $BF_{0:1}$	“Jeffrey’s Evidence” Against $H_0$	Lower Bound on $P(H_0 x)$
.05	.259	(at best) there is substantial evidence	.205
.01	.067	(at best) there is strong evidence	.063
.005	.036	(at best) there is very strong evidence	.035

# Second-Generation P-Values

*Blume, Greevy, Welty, Smith, Dupont*

## Basic Idea

- Switch from point null to **interval null**
- A **descriptive statistic** that conveys the fraction of data-supported hypotheses that are null hypotheses
- Retain old characteristics of p-values (e.g.,  $0 < p < 1$ ) but add new characteristics such as an **ability to indicate when data supports the null**

## Second-Generation P-Values


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### Basic Idea

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Pose the null hypothesis as  $\theta \in [a, b] \equiv H_0$ . Let  $I = [L, U]$  be a  $100(1 - \alpha)\%$  confidence interval for  $\theta$ . Denote measure of overlap as  $|I \cap H_0|$

$$p_\delta = \begin{cases} \frac{|I \cap H_0|}{|I|} & , \text{ if } |I| < 2|H_0| \\ \frac{1}{2} \frac{|I \cap H_0|}{|H_0|} & , \text{ if } |I| > 2|H_0| \end{cases}$$



$$P(p_\delta = 0 | H_0) \leq \alpha$$

# A proposed hybrid effect size plus p-value criterion

*William Goodman, Susan Spruill, Eugene Komaroff*

## Basic Idea

- Switch from point null to **interval null**
- Decision criteria: **Reject null only if there is no overlap** between the interval null and a 95% confidence interval
- Another option: Reject null for cases where **p-value is smaller than .05 and the observed effect size is greater than a “minimum effect size of interest”**

## A Close Relative

We know how to test an interval null hypothesis with a Union-Intersection Test

$X_1, \dots, X_n$  iid  $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$ ,  $\sigma^2$  known.  $H_0: \mu \in [a, b]$  vs.  $H_1: \mu \notin [a, b]$

Reject if either  $\frac{\bar{X} - b}{\sigma / \sqrt{n}} > z_{\alpha/2}$  or  $\frac{\bar{X} - a}{\sigma / \sqrt{n}} < -z_{\alpha/2}$

There is even a UMPU test for this particular case (Schervish, TAS, 1996)

Reject if either  $|\bar{X} - (a + b) / 2| > c$ , choosing  $c$  to satisfy



$$\Phi\left[\frac{(a - b) / 2 - c}{\sigma / \sqrt{n}}\right] + \Phi\left[\frac{(b - a) / 2 - c}{\sigma / \sqrt{n}}\right] = \alpha$$

## A Close Relative

$X_1, \dots, X_n$  iid  $N(\mu, 1)$

$H_0: \mu \in [2, 3]$  vs.  $H_1: \mu \notin [2, 3]$

$\alpha = .05$



# Moving Towards the Post $p < 0.05$ Era via the Analysis of Credibility

*Robert Matthews*

## Basic Idea

- A data set is analyzed by a frequentist
- Find “the” priors that would lead to a Bayesian analysis that would support the frequentist analysis
- Assess the feasibility of those priors

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- Find “the” priors that would lead to a Bayesian analysis that would support the frequentist analysis
- Assess the feasibility of those priors

$X_1, \dots, X_n$  iid  $N(\mu, \phi)$  ,  $\phi$  known

A 95% confidence interval is  $\bar{X} \pm 1.96\sqrt{\phi/n} \equiv (L, U)$ .

Suppose  $0 \notin (L, U)$  so the frequentist declares a non-zero effect.



# Moving Towards the Post $p < 0.05$ Era via the Analysis of Credibility

*Robert Matthews*

A skeptical Bayesian might use a prior like  $\mu \sim N(0, \phi_0)$ .

The resulting 95% credibility interval is

$$\left( \frac{n}{\phi} + \frac{1}{\phi_0} \right)^{-1} \frac{n\bar{X}}{\phi} \pm 1.96 \sqrt{\left( \frac{n}{\phi} + \frac{1}{\phi_0} \right)^{-1}}$$

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Credibility interval **excludes 0** if and only if  $\phi_0 \geq \frac{(U-L)^4}{1.96^2 \times LU}$ .

If the skeptical Bayesian felt they had strong enough prior information

that  $\phi_0 < \frac{(U-L)^4}{1.96^2 \times LU}$  was reasonable they would dispute the frequentist finding.

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Alternatively, suppose  $0 \in (L, U)$  so that the frequentist declares no effect.

An advocating Bayesian might use a prior like  $\mu \sim N(\mu_0, \phi_0)$

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Credibility interval **includes 0** if and only if  $\phi_0 \geq \frac{(U+L)^2}{L^2U^2} \frac{(U-L)^2}{1.96^2 \times 16}$ .

If the advocating Bayesian felt they had strong enough prior information that

$\phi_0 < \frac{(U+L)^2}{L^2U^2} \frac{(U-L)^2}{1.96^2 \times 16}$  was reasonable they would dispute the frequentist finding.

# Thank You!